Forgiveness as Conditional: A Reply to Kleinig by Brookes, Derek R.
Forgiveness as Conditional: A Reply to Kleinig* 
 




In my paper “Moral Grounds for Forgiveness,” I argued that forgiveness is morally 
appropriate only when a sincere apology is received, thus ruling out the three grounds for 
unconditional forgiveness suggested by John Kleinig in his paper “Forgiveness and 
Unconditionality.” In response to his reply “Defending Unconditional Forgiveness,” I 
argue here that my terminology, once clarified, does not undermine my construal of 
resentment; that conditional forgiveness is just as discretionary as unconditional 
forgiveness; and that what we choose to take into account when we forgive must be a 
morally appropriate grounding for that particular end, but that only a sincere apology could 
satisfy this condition. I end by conceding that the three grounds suggested by Kleinig 
nevertheless play an essential role in the process of (conditional) forgiveness insofar as they 
facilitate a willingness to forgive and an openness toward accepting an apology. 
1. DEFENDING CONDITIONAL FORGIVENESS 
1.1 The Moral Function of Resentment 
In my initial paper “Moral Grounds for Forgiveness,”1 I began by setting out 
a range of moral concepts and principles that I took to be largely 
uncontroversial, at least for those who subscribe to “universalistic morality.”2 
I then argued that conditional forgiveness seemed to accord better with these 
concepts and principles than unconditional forgiveness. I took it that, since 
this argument proceeded from a body of shared assumptions, it did not beg 
the question. However, in making this case, I used a number of terms—such 
as “contempt,” “threat” and “protective shield”—that are perhaps less 
commonly employed in this context. Kleinig appears to have read my use of 
 
* Published in the International Journal of Applied Philosophy 35, no. 1 (2022). doi.org/10.5840 
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1 Derek R. Brookes, “Moral Grounds for Forgiveness,” International Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 35, no.1 (2022). doi.org/10.5840/ijap2021129158. [All page references to this paper 
refer to the online first version]. 
2 Cf. “[A]cceptable grounds for forgiveness must be compatible with self-respect, respect for 
others as moral agents, and respect for the rules of morality and the moral order,” writes Jeffrie 
G. Murphy, “Forgiveness and Resentment,” in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, 
Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 24. 
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this language as stacking the deck in favor of conditional forgiveness, given 
that I use this terminology to characterize the function of resentment and this 
characterization, if true, would rule out the moral acceptability of 
unconditional forgiveness.3 However, this “strategy,” Kleinig argues, fails in 
any case. These terms cannot play the role that they do in my argument unless 
they apply to all moral breaches. Yet there are, Kleinig claims, moral breaches 
in which the applicability of such terms would be “dubious” or 
“questionable.” Hence, my defense of forgiveness is flawed, and so the door 
opens to unconditional forgiveness. In the following, I argue that my 
terminology does not have such dire implications. 
Contempt 
In my initial paper, I explained that I would be using the term “contempt” as 
a way of capturing a particular range of “attitudes and behaviors,” such as 
“not recognizing,” “ignoring,” “denying,” or “challenging” someone’s moral 
equality. It was, in other words, intended to be conceptually equivalent to 
“disrespect.” I was, however, reluctant to deploy “disrespect” as a catch-all 
term on the grounds that, unlike “contempt,” it can be heard, especially by 
victims, as too anodyne to capture the enormity of what it is to wrong another 
human being. This is more of an issue for serious offenses, such as murder or 
rape. But it seemed to me that using “contempt” in the context of even minor 
or mitigated wrongs might serve to illuminate the gravity of what we are doing 
whenever we fail to respect the moral worth of another person.4  
Nevertheless, given how I intended this word to be understood, it would 
be difficult to maintain the view that this terminology loads the dice or begs 
any questions in favor of conditional forgiveness. The term could be replaced 
at every point in my account by “disrespect,” and my characterization of 
resentment would remain the same, as would its implications for the moral 
acceptability of unconditional forgiveness. As such, Kleinig’s putative 
counter-examples to the general applicability of “contempt” do not, in 
themselves, undermine my account. If tax cheating, negligently denting 
someone’s car, and the like, can be characterized as a failure to respect the moral 
 
3 Kleinig suggests that I am using this language “strategically,” insofar as he sees a 
“psychological progression from the language of ‘contempt’ to that of ‘threat’ and hence to that 
of a ‘protective shield’.” John Kleinig, “Defending Unconditional Forgiveness,” International 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 35, no.1 (2022): 2, n. 5. [All page reference to this paper refer to 
the online first version]. 
4 See Raimond Gaita’s not dissimilar rationale for using “preciousness” as an alternative to 
“inherent worth,” and in particular his response to putative “counter-examples” such as 
Eichmann. Raimond Gaita, A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice 
(London and NY: Routledge, 2002), xxiii-xxiv. 
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worth of another human being, then these cases amount to “contempt,” as I was 
using the term. If they cannot be characterized in this way, they are not moral 
breaches—in which case, they are irrelevant.5  
Threat 
Kleinig is unsure whether I was using the term “threat” to denote a physical 
danger, a “symbolic” threat, or some combination of both. So, to be clear, I 
meant this term to refer only to a moral threat: that is, the kind of threat that 
arises for me when someone fails to respect my moral worth. Unfortunately, 
Kleinig’s uncertainty on this matter infects his critique. He ascribes 
connotations to my use of the word that would only serve as counter-examples 
to its general applicability if I had intended “threat” to entail the presence of 
a physical danger. 6 For instance, Kleinig claims that “the lack of apology 
can[not] be read as signaling a continuing menace”7; and that “One is 
indignant, not fearful.”8 Once again, the term “threat” could be replaced with 
a less colorful turn of phrase, such as “being the recipient of disrespect,” and 
there would be no substantive loss to my construal of resentment. 
Nevertheless, like “contempt,” it seems to me that the word “threat,” once 
disambiguated, is both accurate and instructive.  
Ongoing Threat 
Kleinig contends that “victimization does not represent an ongoing threat.”9 
I will not reiterate the main reasons that I gave for this characterization in my 
 
5 As it happens, I think “contempt” can be sensibly applied in such cases. It seems both natural 
and morally illuminating to say that a tax cheat shows contempt toward her fellow (taxpaying) 
citizens, given how she free rides off their honesty. A similar case can be made for saying that 
denting a car out of negligence (not accidentally) manifests a level of contempt for its owner. 
Negligence might be mitigating, but it is not exculpatory. Again, Kleinig accepts that it would be 
appropriate to say that I “show contempt” for you if, down the line, I refuse to accept 
responsibility for denting your car (Kleinig, “Defending,” 2). But just as retrospective 
responsibility is parasitic on prospective responsibility, the contempt shown by not accepting 
responsibility is surely just doubling down on the contempt manifested in the original failure to 
act responsibly. (Cf. “[W]e hold a parent retrospectively responsible for her child’s truancy only 
insofar as it was her prospective responsibility to ensure that he attended school,” writes Antony 
Duff, “Who is Responsible, for What, to Whom?” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 2, no. 2 
(2005): 443.  
6 Granted, moral threats will often be implicitly conveyed via physical threats, but such a 
medium is not essential. 
7 Kleinig, “Defending,” 2. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 2. 
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initial paper.10 But I will add two points of clarification that may serve to 
ameliorate Kleinig’s concerns. First, like the threat of a nuclear war, a victim 
need not be fully conscious of being under an ongoing moral threat at every 
waking moment. It is the threat that is ongoing, not their subjective awareness 
of it. Second, the persistence of a moral threat is inherently linked to the 
wrongdoer. It is not “ongoing” in the sense that, once initiated, it takes on a 
life of its own, like the smile of a Cheshire cat. A moral threat can only exist 
for as long as the wrongdoer fails to denounce and withdraw the message of 
disrespect that was implicit in their wrongdoing. Until then, the victim can 
only assume that the offender stands by his original message.11  
Wrongdoing as a threat to self-respect 
Kleinig argues that, in claiming that a wrongdoer’s “refusal to show respect 
constitutes an ongoing threat to [the victim’s] self-respect,” I am positing an 
“unnecessarily strong connection between the respect of others and self-
respect.”12 Later, he claims that “[a] person who chooses to forgive – whether 
or not the wrongdoer acknowledges the wrongdoing – may have a strong sense 
of self-respect and of the seriousness of the wrong that was done.”13 
But we need to distinguish between a person’s sense of self-respect in 
general and her self-respect in relation to the wrongdoing. For most victims, 
their overall self-respect will not depend entirely on how the wrongdoer sees 
them. We all have multiple sources of self-respect. For some of us, these pre-
existing sources will be so strong and abundant that they will tend to 
overwhelm certain kinds of threats. This is why some victims can retain a 
strong sense of self-respect in general, even when faced with an unapologetic 
 
10 See Brookes, “Moral Grounds,” 4. 
11 This provides an answer to Kleinig’s contention that it is “deeply counterintuitive” to 
suppose “there can be no forgiveness of the dead” (Kleinig, “Defending,” 4). A wrongdoer 
cannot stand by their message of disrespect if they no longer exist—in which case forgiveness 
will no longer be applicable. The victim may still be subject to recurrent feelings of bitterness 
and anger, perhaps triggered by memories of the wrong or its ongoing impact on their lives. But 
there are effective therapeutic strategies that can help to remove or minimize such feelings, none 
of which need be conceived of as forgiveness. As to unknown perpetrators (Kleinig, 
“Defending,” n. 10) or “non-apologetic wrongdoers with whom one has lost all contact” 
(Kleinig, “Defending,” 4)—which may include the dead if there is an afterlife—the moral threat 
their actions have posed will remain, and so forgiveness, on my account, will not be an option, 
at least until contact becomes possible. But there are morally acceptable strategies other than 
forgiveness that can, in the meantime, marginalize the victim’s subjective awareness of the threat 
to their self-respect, and thus the extent to which feelings of resentment will dominate their life. 
For instance, the victim could focus their attention on other sources of self-respect, such as the 
love and respect of close colleagues, friends, and family.  
12 Kleinig, “Defending,” 2. 
13 Ibid., 3. 
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wrongdoer. Nevertheless, as I argued in my initial paper, we are social 
creatures, and so are, to a greater or lesser extent, vulnerable to how others 
see us, even strangers. Consequently, most of us will tend to resist the message 
of disrespect that is conveyed to us whenever we are wronged. From a 
normative perspective, this reaction is entirely warranted, so long as it is 
morally appropriate and proportionate. And this, I have argued, is the role of 
resentment. The purpose of this instinctive emotional reaction is to provide 
us with a means of protecting ourselves against specific challenges to our self-
respect.14  
In sum, my claim is not that forgiveness in the absence of an apology 
evidences a lack of self-respect in general. But it does betray the victim’s 
unwillingness to affirm or stand by her own moral equality in the face of a 
specific challenge. As such, it manifests a lack of self-respect in relation to the 
wrongdoing in question, and thus fails to constitute an appropriate assessment 
of the seriousness of the breach. 
Resentment as a protective shield 
Kleinig argues that, in characterizing resentment as a “protective shield” 
against the ongoing moral threat posed by wrongdoing, I have “distorted the 
experience of resentment.” Kleinig suggests that “my reaction to being 
wronged may be ‘what a nerve!’ rather than a sense of threat against which I 
have to be secured.”15 But this simply pits how I am reacting (resentment) 
 
14 Kleinig is “somewhat puzzled” by my distinction between vindictiveness as an “offensive” 
response and resentment as “defensive” on the grounds that “many would see resentment as 
implying ‘deserving of punishment’” (Kleinig, “Defending,” n. 11). But first, this “puzzle” 
dissolves once one distinguishes my own account of resentment from those who conflate 
resentment with vindictiveness, and so, in my view, misconstrue it as “offensive” (e.g., 
Resentment is “a retributive passion that instinctively seeks to exact a due measure of 
punishment.” Charles L. Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 39. Or again, resentment involves “wishing harm” to the 
wrongdoer or “relishing the discomfort and pain that he suffers.” Eve Garrard and David 
McNaughton, Forgiveness. Durham, NC: Acumen, 2010), 23). Such accounts are especially 
unfortunate, since they mistakenly entail that a victim’s inability to forgive must, by definition, 
be due to her vindictiveness or hatred, and so she can, for that reason, be deemed morally 
deficient. Second, even if resentment was offensive, that would not, on its own, be sufficient to 
render the wrongdoer “deserving of punishment.” Punishment must be grounded in public 
interest considerations, not the private feelings or views of the victim. This is why, as Kleinig 
notes, “forgiven or not, Roof was not exempted from punishment,” Kleinig, “Defending,” n. 21. 
Cf. “Just because a person commits an offence against me . . . that does not privilege my voice 
above that of the court (acting ‘in the general public interest’) in the matter of the offender’s 
punishment,” writes Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 428. 
15 Kleinig, “Defending,” 2. 
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against why I am reacting in this way (to protect myself against a challenge to 
my self-respect). The two are not mutually exclusive. Resentment only works 
because it contains exactly the right cognitive content and qualitative feel (an 
inner tightening or toughening up) needed to protect ourselves against the 
kind of threat that we face whenever we fail to be shown due respect: “No, 
you are wrong,” it says, “I am your moral equal.”  
1.2 Forgiveness as Morally Discretionary  
Kleinig claims that forgiveness is normally construed, even by advocates of 
conditional forgiveness, as a “determination to forgo resentment” on moral 
grounds.16 This element of moral discretion, he suggests, is incompatible with 
my characterization of the experience of forgiveness as occurring when our 
resentment “naturally falls away” in the face of a genuine apology.17  
On the contrary, both conditional and unconditional forgiveness are 
discretionary in precisely the same way.18 As I argued in my initial paper, the 
emotion of resentment is not within our immediate control. We cannot stop 
feeling resentment at will. But we do have some control over the conditions 
to which it is a natural reaction. Hence, the “determination to forgo my 
resentment” should be understood as meaning the determination to do 
whatever will make it possible for my resentment to dissipate. The 
requirement of any normative account of forgiveness, then, is to identify not 
only those option(s) that will have the desired psychological effect, but also 
what option(s) would be morally acceptable.  
Conditional forgiveness takes the view that the only option of this kind that 
is available to a victim is to place themselves in a position whereby they can 
hear a genuine apology. Only then will their resentment dissipate in a morally 
acceptable way. It might be thought that this removes the victim’s discretion 
to forgive, since it is now dependent on the wrongdoer’s apology. But this fails 
to recognize the complexity of communication. A sender’s message is not like 
a drug that is injected into the receiver, without any possibility of rejection or 
loss of content.19 In saying that resentment will “naturally fall away” in the 
face of a genuine apology, then, I do not mean that every victim, no matter 
 
16 Ibid., 3. 
17 Ibid. 
18 As I argued in my initial paper, the victim’s offer of forgiveness is also morally discretionary. 
But this decision can (or should) only take place after their resentment has dissipated in the 
experience of forgiveness, and so is not germane to the prospective decision to forgo their 
resentment. See Brookes, “Moral Grounds,” 4-5. 
19 Cf. Hugh Mackay, Why Don’t People Listen? Solving the Communication Problem 
(Macmillan Australia, 1994), 15. 
FORGIVENESS AS CONDITIONAL: A REPLY TO KLEINIG   7 
   
 
 
what they bring to the table, can expect this outcome. The resentment felt by 
a victim will not dissipate unless they can hear a genuine apology for what it 
is. They need to be able to absorb and accept the fact that the wrongdoer has 
denounced and withdrawn their message of disrespect. In other words, they 
need to be willing to forgive. Ordinarily, it will take a great deal of inner work 
to reach this point. If they are prepared to undertake this work, then, when 
they do hear a sincere apology, their resentment will naturally fall away.  
In my initial paper, I argued that, if the victim were to engage in the kind 
of reflections and transformative inner work that would enable them to take 
into account Kleinig’s three considerations—the suffering of the wrongdoer, 
a sense of moral solidarity with them, and, where relevant, a pre-existing 
relationship—this would increase their willingness to forgive. But the 
wrongdoer is in no position to demand that the victim undertake this 
preparatory work, nor can they assume that it has been done. No wrongdoer 
should expect that a sincere apology will be sufficient to elicit forgiveness 
(“I’ve said ‘sorry’, so why can’t you forgive me?”). If the victim’s resentment 
dissipates in response to an apology, this will only be due to the fact that they 
have freely chosen to put in the requisite preliminary work—the potential 
difficulty and sheer beneficence of which should not be underestimated.20  
In sum, conditional and unconditional forgiveness are both discretionary, 
and in the same way. Where they differ is how they conceive of what it is that 
a victim is doing when they engage in the inner work mentioned above. On 
Kleinig’s account, this discretionary work can, even in the absence of an 
apology, have the effect of diminishing resentment and it is driven by morally 
laudable motives. So, it should, he claims, be accepted as a species of 
forgiveness. I agree that the victim’s decision to undertake this inner work is 
laudable, and that it can result in significant psychological healing, but it is 
not yet forgiveness. This work only makes it possible for the victim to 
experience forgiveness.  
This distinction can be further elucidated by examining Kleinig’s 
statement that: “Forgiveness changes the wrongdoer’s moral status in the eyes 
of the wronged person; it does not require that the wrongdoer become a better 
 
20 Kleinig suggests that, even if Dylann Roof had shown genuine remorse and offered a sincere 
apology, Roxane Gay might still have said “I . . . am done forgiving” (Kleinig, “Defending,” 5) 
—perhaps on the grounds that, from her perspective, any such apology would invariably be 
“tainted” by the unresolved historical wrongs of slavery and ongoing cultural racism. But far 
from showing that the constraints of conditional forgiveness are too narrow, Kleinig’s 
hypothetical instead illustrates how extraordinarily difficult it can be for a victim to absorb or 
accept even a genuine apology, especially when the wrongdoing has caused severe harm and 
ongoing trauma.  
8   DEREK R. BROOKES 
person.”21 What is this “change in moral status”? Is it that, in the eyes of the 
victim, the wrongdoer is no longer seen as morally responsible for what they 
did? Or that their actions did not, in fact, fail to treat the victim as a moral 
equal? Perhaps the wrongdoer has undergone moral changes in ways that are 
unrelated to the wrongdoing, such as an increase in their trustworthiness or 
humility. But Kleinig rules out the notion that forgiveness should require that 
the wrongdoer “become a better person.” Yet it is hard to see what other 
changes in moral status are possible. The reality is that, insofar as the 
wrongdoer is unapologetic, they retain the moral status of a wrongdoer who, 
so far as the victim can determine, continues to stand by their wrongdoing. 
The victim can only change how they see an unapologetic wrongdoer’s moral 
status by engaging in a mental sleight of hand. They must be willing to 
overlook, condone, dismiss, or discount the moral reality of the situation.  
2. A CRITIQUE OF UNCONDITIONAL FORGIVENESS 
In the second part of his reply, Kleinig argues that the discretionary nature of 
forgiveness undermines my critique of his account. “We have a fairly wide 
choice,” he claims, “in how we display our generosity to others and how and 
which of their sufferings we believe it appropriate to take into account in our 
dealings with them.”22 Thus, we do not need to be constrained by the 
assumption that forgiveness requires a genuine apology. We are free to explore 
alternative moral reasons, such as the three circumstances Kleinig proposes. 
We can choose to ground our forgiveness in whatever insights can be gleaned 
from, say, our sense of moral solidarity with the wrongdoer, so long as in doing 
so we exercise “virtues such as generosity, charity, love, mercy or grace.” 23  
But it is not clear that we have as much discretionary latitude as Kleinig 
suggests. What we choose to take into account when we forgive must be a 
morally appropriate grounding for that particular end. I can choose to become 
sensitized to the “benightedness” of a Dylann Roof, but it does not follow that 
the sense of moral solidarity that I thereby attain can, on its own, constitute a 
morally acceptable ground for forgiving him. 
This point can perhaps be made more vivid by exploring Kleinig’s 
contention that conditional forgiveness cannot account for situations in which 
“the alleged wrongdoer and the victim cannot agree as to the moral facts of 
the case. A believes that B wronged her; B does not believe that he did wrong.” 
 
21 Kleinig, “Defending,” 3. 
22 Ibid., 4. 
23 Ibid., 3. 
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In such cases, Kleinig suggests, it should be possible for A to exercise her 
prerogative to forgive B (even though B sees no need to be forgiven) so that 
“they can repair ruptured relations,” which had hitherto been blocked by A’s 
resentment toward B.24 
We can agree that repairing relations is a morally worthy goal. But, under 
these circumstances, is it morally appropriate for A to do so by forgiving B? 
The obstacle in this situation is not A’s lack of forgiveness, but rather the fact 
that either A or B is not in possession of the moral facts. If A is mistaken, 
then, if she were to “forgive” B, this would only compound her error, since B 
has done nothing for which he needs to be forgiven. If B has wronged A, but 
refuses to accept that he did, then A’s unilateral “forgiveness” will not repair 
the moral breach, since B has not yet denounced and withdrawn his message 
of disrespect.  
Assuming that both A and B are acting in good faith, the only way forward 
is for them to re-check the evidence available to them, try to address their own 
prejudices, put aside their reputational fears or the shame of being wrong, do 
their best to persuade the other (without manipulation or coercion), and so 
on. If neither A nor B are able to change their minds, then they would have 
two options: (a) they could try to resume the relationship on an agree-to-
disagree basis; but (b) if the wrong is sufficiently serious, then, given that A 
still believes she has sufficient reason to think that B has wronged her, B’s 
refusal to accept responsibility and apologize for this wrong would constitute 
reasonable grounds for A to end or at least suspend the relationship until one 
or the other changes their mind.25 Estrangement is rarely pleasant, but in some 
cases it is the only viable option if we are to maintain and protect our self-
respect and avoid re-victimization.26 When a moral breach occurs, the 
“presumptive moral status quo”27 cannot be magically conjured up out of thin 
air. Forgiveness is not a matter of pretending that the moral breach has been 
healed or that it no longer matters. And if it were, it would lack any moral 
credibility. 
 
24 Ibid., 4. 
25 Kleinig might object that, in such a scenario, A’s continuing resentment could “become an 
instrument of manipulation” (Kleinig, “Defending,” 5), compelling B to apologize even though 
he believes he is innocent. But this possibility is hardly an inherent feature of conditional 
forgiveness, understood as an account of the conditions under which we ought to forgive. A 
begrudging and insincere apology is precisely the opposite of what such an account would 
prescribe. 
26 As Kleinig puts it, “Where forgiveness is a prelude to reconciliation between persons who 
have a pre-existing relationship and the forgiver wishes to re-establish that relationship, apology 
might well be required.” Kleinig, “Defending,” n. 22. 
27 Kleinig, “Defending,” 4. 
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3. CONCLUSION 
A moral breach can be usefully compared to a bridge that has been destroyed, 
with the victim standing on one side of the breach and the wrongdoer on the 
other. The bridge cannot be re-constructed from one side only: it will 
eventually collapse for lack of support once it extends across the halfway 
point. Both the victim and the wrongdoer must therefore be willing to 
construct their respective sides of the bridge if the structure is to hold. The 
victim will need to do whatever inner work will enable them to hear a genuine 
apology, and thus experience forgiveness. The wrongdoer must face their 
shame, acknowledge their responsibility, demonstrate remorse, and offer a 
sincere apology to the victim.  
Does this mean that the victim’s endeavor to forgive is ultimately 
dependent on the wrongdoer’s apology? Yes, but only for the final closing 
stage. The victim remains free to construct their half of the bridge regardless. 
If an apology is not forthcoming by the time the victim has completed their 
work, the breach will of course remain. But the victim will be better able to 
move on or let go, knowing they have done all they can to heal the moral 
wound without thereby abjuring their self-respect. Should the offender finish 
his half of the bridge, however, the two sides will be able to reconnect naturally 
and appropriately, thus repairing the breach.28 
What Kleinig calls “unconditional forgiveness” is, in my view, the victim’s 
construction of their side of the bridge. It can feel somewhat like the 
experience of forgiveness because it is oriented toward the goal of moral 
repair, and because it can have the effect of reducing the intensity or 
dominance of resentment. And since it is driven by virtuous motives, it is 
morally laudable in its own right. Indeed, I would concede that this kind of 
inner work is an essential stage in the overall process of forgiveness. But for 
all the reasons given, it is a step too far to conceive of this work, taken on its 





28 This analogy should not be taken to imply that conditional forgiveness requires or necessarily 
results in the resumption of a relationship. Moral repair may be necessary, but it is not sufficient 
for reconciliation. As Kleinig notes, a betrayed wife can choose to “part ways” with a genuinely 
apologetic, but “akratic husband, at the same time forgiving him for his misdeeds,” Kleinig, 
“Defending,” 3.  
